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 Cutting Cyberstalking's Gordian Knot: A Simple and Unified Statutory Approach Casey Hoynes-0 'Connor* 
I. Introduction 
The Internet and other telecommunications technologies are promoting 
advances in virtually every aspect of society and every comer of the globe: 
fostering commerce, improving education and health care, promoting 
participatory democracy in the United States and abroad, and facilitating 
communications among family and friends, whether across the street or 
around the world. Unfortunately, many of the attributes of this 
technology-low cost, ease of use, and anonymous nature, among 
others-make it an attractive medium for fraudulent scams, child sexual 
exploitation, and increasingly, a new concern known as 'cyberstalking.' 1 
These words, written more than a decade ago, described the emerging difficulty of 
keeping apace with technology in a rapidly changing world. With the explosion of social 
media and expansion in online capabilities forming new means through which 
cyberstalkers accomplish their malicious ends, these concerns resonate no less strongly 
today. Although the law has attempted to keep up, the current system creates dueling 
obligations and confusions that often obscure justice. 
Consider the case of Jake Baker and Arthur Gonda.2 The two men were online 
acquaintances who exchanged e-mails that expressed their mutual "sexual interest in 
violence against women.''3 Their often-explicit communications detailed their intention 
to convert their interest into action.4 For example, "Wiat [sic] until late at night. grab 
[sic] her when she goes to unlock the door. Knock her unconscious. and [sic] put her 
into one of those portable lockers (forget the word for it). or [sic] even a duffle bag. 
• J.D. Candidate, 2013, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A. summa cum laude, 2009, Rutgers 
University. 
1 1999 Report on Cyberstalking: A New Challenge for Law Enforcement and Industry: A Report from the 
Attorney General to the Vice President (Aug., 1999), 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/cybercrime/cyberstalking.htm. 
2 U.S. v. Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d 1492 (6th Cir. 1997). . 
3 !d. at 1493. 
4/d. 
Then hurry her out to the car and take her away ... What do you think?"5 Baker went 
further, posting a story on an online forum that described "the torture, rape, and murder 
of a young woman who shared the name of one of Baker's classmates at the University of 
Michigan."6 When the story was discovered, the duo was indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 
875(c), which prohibits sending a "communication containing any threat" in interstate 
commerce. 
7 Despite the vile nature of the communications and the apparent applicability 
of the statute, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the indictment. 8 
According to the court, for a communication to rise to the level of "threat," it must be 
"conveyed to effect some change or achieve some goal through intimidation. "9 Because 
Baker and Gonda neither sought change nor desired a particular goal, their terrifying 
rhetoric went unpunished. 10 
Cyberstalkers also use the Internet to facilitate their in-person stalking, often 
bypassing steps in the "course of conduct" required by many traditional stalking 
statutes, 11 as in the case of Amy Lynn Boyer. 12 She was stalked and later murdered while 
leaving work by Liam Youens, a man she did not know. 13 What is notable about this 
5 Id at 1500. 
6 !d. at 1493. 
7 !d.; 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) 
8 Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d at 1492. 
9 Id at 1497. 
10 !d. at 1496. 
11 New Hampshires stalking statute, for instance, prohibits a person from engaging in a "course of conduct 
targeted at a specific person which would cause a reasonable person to fear for his or her personal safety.'' 
N.H. Rev. Stat.§ 633:3-a. The statute enumerates certain behavior included in a "course of conduct," like 
"[f]ollowing, approaching, or confronting ... [or] [a]ppearing in close proximity to [the person]. ld 
Notably absent are non-physical methods of information gathering. 
12 Chris Wright, Murder.com: What happened last fall on this tiny New Hampshire street triggered a 
national debate on Internet crime. But was the Web really to blame for the death of Amy Boyer? THE 
BOSTON PHOENIX (Aug. 10-17, 2000), 
http://www.bostonphoenix.com/archive/features/00/08/IOIMURDER.html. 
13 ld After murdering Boyer, Youens turned his gun on himself. !d. 
2 
tragedy is that Y ouens did not obtain Boyer's work address as stalkers normally do. 14 
Instead, he purchased the information, as well as her social security number, from an 
online data broker called Docusearch.15 As Youens himself acknowledged, "[i]t' s 
actually obscene what you can find out about a person on the intemet."16 
Even newer technologies have provided individuals different means with which to 
harass. 17 Offensive communications on social networking websites like Facebook and 
Twitter present traditional First Amendment issues in unique contexts. In a recent 
example, William Cassidy allegedly posted hundreds of threatening Twitter messages, 
almost all aimed at American Buddhist figure Alyce Zeoli.18 Cassidy argued that a 
conviction would impinge upon his First Amendment rights, and the District Court of 
Maryland agreed.19 In defense of its position, the court analogized Twitter to colonial-era 
bulletin boards, leaving itself vulnerable to the criticism that its understanding of the 
medium lacks nuance.2° Clearly, the courts are still grappling with the proper 
characterization of these websites and the nature of their communications, a difficulty 
that underscores the challenges inherent in creating viable statutory mechanisms for 
punishing cyberstalking. 
14 Id 
15 /d 
16 /d 
17 See, e.g., Somini Sengupta, Case of8,000 Menacing Posts Tests Limits ofTwitter Speech, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 26,2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011!08/27/technology/man-accused-of-stalking-via-twitter-
claims-free-speech.html?_r=2&hp; Bob Sullivan, Vengeful Online Sex Ads Take Growing Toll, THE 
REDTAPE CHRONICLES, July 27,2010, http://redtape.msnbc.msn.com/_news/2010/07/27/6345571-vengeful-
online-sex-ads-take-growing-toll; Caroline Black, Ex-Marine Jebidiah James Stipe Gets 60 Years for 
Craigslist Rape Plot, CBS NEWS, July 29,2010, http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-504083_162-20009162-
504083 .html. 
18 Sengupta, supra note 17. 
19 U.S. v. Cassidy, No. RWT 11-091,2011 WL 6260872 (D. Mass. Dec. 15, 2011); see infra text 
accompanying notes 159-68. 
20 /d. 
3 
"Cyberstalking by proxy"21 further complicates the picture, as the recent 
Craigslist rape case demonstrates.22 Jebidiah James Stipe created a false Craigslist 
posting in his ex-girlfriend's name in which he claimed that she had a rape fantasy.23 
Another man, Ty Oliver MacDowell, believing the ad to be legitimate, went to her house 
and raped her at gunpoint.24 Stipe was indeed punished, but not under any cyberstalking 
laws. 25 Although this type of conduct seems like exactly the type of harm that 
cyberstalking statutes should address, the current cyberstalking statutory regime is 
inadequate because both state and federal laws require the perpetrator to contact the 
victim directly.26 Some commentators have called for amendments to address this 
shortcoming. 27 
The foregoing illustrates the insufficiency ofthe criminal law as presently 
constituted to address cyberstalking. While state and federal statutes exist, they often fail 
to criminalize conduct whose harms are self-evident, as in the cases above. When the 
statutes do cover such conduct, they do so in divergent ways. The resultant web of 
statutory prohibitions creates an incoherent system that does more harm than good. 
This Comment will argue that a unified federal approach is needed to remedy the 
problem and successfully control cyberstalking. Part II addresses the current state-by-
state approach, arguing that it is both deficient from a policy perspective and violative of 
the Dormant Commerce Clause. Part III turns to the three federal statutes currently 
21 Sullivan, supra note 17. 
22 Black, supra note 17. 
23 !d. 
24 !d. 
25 Stipe pleaded guilty to sexual assault, aggravated kidnapping, and aggravated burglazy, and will serve a 
sixty-year prison sentence. !d. 
26 See Naomi Harlin Goodno, Cyberstalking, A New Crime: Evaluating the Effectiveness of Current State 
and Federal Laws, 72 Mo. LAW REv. 125, 152 (2007); see infra text accompanying notes 45-55,212-214, 
227-233. 
27 !d.; see infra text accompanying notes 227233. 
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applied to quell cyberstalking, highlighting their own unique problems. Part IV 
advocates one federal law, drafted broadly enough to encompass the increasingly broad 
array of cyberstalking activities. More specifically, Part IV proposes that the federal 
government's primary cyberstalking statute be amended to remove unnecessary 
procedural roadblocks, to expand the bases for prosecution, to standardize the 
government's approach to cyberstalking, and to provide federal recourse for the victims 
of cyberstalking. By adopting these proposals, the federal government will begin 
repairing the significant inadequacies of the present system. 
II. A State~by~State Approach to Cyberstalking Legislation is Inappropriate. 
It is undeniable that when we use the Internet, we do so without an appreciation of 
what state we are in. 28 The Internet is an incorporeal space, devoid of artificial 
boundaries and topographical landmarks. 29 As the District Court for the Southern 
District of New York noted in American Libraries Ass 'n v. Pataki, "geography ... is a 
virtually meaningless construct on the Internet."30 Given this reality, laws addressing 
conduct on the Internet should reflect the notion that state boundaries have no meaning 
on the Internet and that individuals are likely unaware of the variations between states' 
laws, or even, perhaps, in what state their Internet conduct is taking place. 31 
Nevertheless, states have enacted and modified a broad array of statutes that 
address cyberstalking.32 These statutes fall into three general categories: (1) 
28 969 F. Supp. 160, 167 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). 
29 American Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 837 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (the Internet is a "single 
body of knowledge''). 
30 Pataki, 969 F. Supp. at 169. 
31 See id. 
32 See, e.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT.§ 5/12-7.5 (2011); WYO. STAT. ANN.§ 6-2-506 (1977); 13 VT. STAT. 
ANN.§ 1027 (2011); ALASKA STAT. ANN.§§ 11.41.260, 11.41.270 (West 2006); ARK. CODE ANN.§ 5-41-
108 (West 2011); COLO. REv. STAT.§ 602 (2010); FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 784.048 (2011); Utah Code Ann. § 
106.5 (2008). 
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cyberstalking-specific laws;33 (2) general stalking laws that have been amended to cover 
cyberstalking;34 and (3) non-stalking laws applied to like conduct.35 What follows is a 
brief survey of current state approaches to cyberstalking, through which a few things 
should become clear. The first is that states often have clever and efficient ways of 
drafting their statutes. Their methods vary widely, however, and while certain elements 
of these statutes are commendable, the resulting inconsistency creates confusion and 
competing obligations for the Internet user. Within the unique framework of the Internet 
landscape, this result should be impermissible. 36 And as will be explained further below, 
these laws-for many of the same reasons-also violate the Dormant Commerce Clause. 
A. State Law Inconsistencies 
Illinois is one of a few states that has passed a cyberstalking-specific statute. Its 
expansive law makes a first cyberstalking conviction a Class 4 felony. 37 The law 
provides that someone "commits cyberstalking when he or she engages in a course of 
conduct using electronic communication directed at a specific person, and he or she 
knows or should know that would cause a reasonable person to" either "fear for his or her 
safety or the safety of a third person; or suffer other emotional distress. "38 A person also 
33 See, e.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT.§ 5/12-7.5 (2011). 
34 See, e.g., WYO. STAT. ANN.§ 6-2-506 (1977). 
35 See, e.g., 13 VT. STAT. ANN.§ 1027 (2011). 
36 Indeed, courts and commentators alike have long recognized the desirability of uniformity between the 
states in a wide variety of contexts. See generally Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1118 
(9th Cir. 2007) (noting the inconsistency between states' intellectual property laws, and concluding that 
allowing state laws to regulate Internet-based intellectual property would "be contracy to Congress's 
expressed goal of insulating the development of the Internet from the various state-law regimes."); Wendy 
Trahan, The Future of Sales and Use Tax on Electronic Commerce: Promoting Uniformity After Quill, 21 
V.A. TAX REV. 101, 117-18 (2001) ("Uniform sales and use tax legislation may reduce the burden 
on electronic commerce businesses that are subject to vacying state and local government collection 
obligations."); Kenneth W. Swenson, A Stitch in Time: The Continental Shelf, Environmental Ethics, and 
Federalism, 60S. CAL. L. REv. 851, 882 (1987) (noting the need for uniform legislation in the context of 
environmental regulation). 
37 720 ILL. COMP. STAT.§ 5/12-7.5 (2011). 
3& /d. 
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commits cyberstalking "when he or she~ knowingly and without lawful justification) on at 
least 2 separate occasions~ harasses another person" -or solicits his or her harassment-
through the use of electronic communication by transmitting a threat that places a 
"person in reasonable apprehension of immediate or future bodily harm. "39 
Although these two provisions are fairly standard, the legislature also included 
language unique to other cyberstalking laws. Specifically, the law also punishes one who 
"creates and maintains an Internet website or webpage" that harasses a person) 
communicates a threat, or solicits an act that would violate the provision.40 This 
subsection is important because it seemingly applies to the conduct of William Lawrence 
Cassidy, who, as mentioned above, was accused of posting threatening Twitter messages 
about Buddhist leader Alyce Zeoli.41 Furthermore, the provision appears to reach the 
conduct of the defendants in Alkhabaz, whose indictments under a federal statute were 
dismissed) the court finding that their conduct~ though "sadistic," did not amount to 
"communication containing a threat. "42 
Whether Illinois's statute would address either the online information gathering of 
Liam Youens43 or the "cyberstalking by proxy" of Jebidiah James Stipe,44 however, is an 
open question, devoid of guiding case law. The statute would most likely not apply to 
Y ouens because of the "directed at a specific person" requirement. Although Y ouens did 
undergo a "course of conduct" directed at Boyer, it would be difficult to argue that the 
statutorily imperative portion of that course of conduct that occurred online was directed 
39 Id 
40 ld. 
41 Sengupta, supra note 17. 
42 104 F.3d 1492, 1497-98 (6th Cir. 1997). The federal statue under which the defendants were charged 
was 18 U.S.C. § 875(c). 
43 Wright, supra note 12. 
44 Black, supra note 17. 
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at her. The statute's applicability to Stipe's conduct is a closer call. While no provision 
within the statute fits his conduct directly, a court could interpret each of the three to 
cover "cyberstalking by proxy." 
Mississippi's cyberstalking law contains four provisions, 45 and differs from 
Illinois's in certain respects.46 Under this statute, it is unlawful for a person to use in 
electronic communication "any words or language threatening to inflict bodily hann.',47 
Second, it is unlawful to repeatedly contact another person electronically "for the purpose 
of threatening, terrifying or harassing" that person. 48 The conduct prohibited by this 
provision would likely not be punishable by Illinois's cyberstalking law, though the 
ultimate determination would depend on the content of the messages. Third, it is 
unlawful to make false statements "concerning death, injury, illness, disfigurement, 
indecent conduct, or criminal conduct" about a person or his family "with the intent to 
threaten, terrify or harass."49 Finally, it is unlawful to "[k]nowingly permit an electronic 
communication device under the person's control to be used for any purpose prohibited 
by this section. "50 
Although, again, the courts have been silent on the statute's application, the 
statute's language suggests that it fails to address all but the most conventional 
cyberstalking behavior. 51 For instance, its provisions require the offender to contact the 
victim directly; therefore, the statute will not attach to the online postings of Jake Baker 
45 MISS. CODE ANN.§ 97~45~15 (West 2003). 
46 Compare MISS. CODE ANN.§ 97~45-15 (West 2003), and720 ILL. COMP. STAT.§ 5/12-7.5 (2011) .. 
47 MISS. CODE ANN.§ 97~45-15 (West2003). 
48 ld 
49 ld 
so Id 
51 See MISS. CODE ANN.§ 9745-15 (West 2003). 
8 
and Arthur Gonda,52 the online information gathering ofLiam Youens,53 the malicious 
Twitter postings of William Lawrence Cassidy,54 or the "cyberstalking by proxy" of 
J ebidiah James Stipe. 55 
Interestingly, North Carolina's cyberstalking statute mirrors Mississippi's statute 
nearly word for word. 56 In fact, the only differences that can be found with respect to the 
prohibited conduct rest in the mens rea requirements of the second and third provisions. 57 
Where in Mississippi the conduct is unlawful if it is committed with the intent to threaten, 
terrify, or harass, 58 the same conduct is unlawful in North Carolina if it is connnitted with 
the intent to "abuse, annoy, threaten, terrify, harass, or embarrass."59 Neither legislature 
explains the difference in mens rea, but North Carolina's mens rea requirements reflect 
those in its pre-existing telephone harassment statute, suggesting that the matter is more 
one of statutory continuity than one of legislative precision. 60 
A more significant discrepancy between the two states statutes, however, resides 
in the two states' respective punishments. In Mississippi, cyberstalking is a felony 
offense punishable by up to five years for a repeat offense; in North Carolina, on the 
other hand, cyberstalking is merely a class 2 misdemeanor, with a maximum prison 
sentence of sixty days.61 As a result, individuals found guilty of exactly the same 
52 U.S. v. Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d 1492, 1492 (6th Cir. 1997). 
53 Wright, supra note 12. 
54 Sengupta, supra note 17. 
55 Black, supra note 17. 
56 N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN.§ 14-196.3 (West 2000). 
57 ld 
58 Miss. CODE ANN.§ 97-45-15 (West 2003). 
59 N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN.§ 14-196.3 (West 2000) (emphasis added). 
60 N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN.§ 14-196.3 (West2000). 
61 Mrss. CODE ANN. § 97-45-15 (West 2003) provides that cyberstalking is a "felony punishable by 
imprisonment for not more than two (2) years." If the communication contains a "credible threat," 
however, or if the offense is a repeat offense, then it is "punishable by imprisonment for no more than five 
(5) years. !d. In North Carolina, on the other hand, a class 2 misdemeanor carries a maximum prison 
9 
conduct face the prospect of very different punishments depending on the location of 
their conduct. It is this very type of disparity that renders the state system so problematic. 
Another approach that states take is to amend traditional stalking statutes to 
encompass cyberstalking behavior.62 Wyoming's astutely composed stalking statute 
punishes someone who, with the intent to harass, 
engages in a course of conduct reasonably likely to harass that person, 
including but not limited to any combination of the following: (i) 
Communicating, anonymously or otherwise, or causing a communication 
with another person by verbal [or] electronic ... means in a manner that 
harasses; (ii) Following a person ... ; (iii) Placing a person under 
surveillance ... ; (iv) Otherwise engaging in a course of conduct that 
harasses another person. 63 
The Wyoming legislature recognized that, today, stalking takes place both online and off: 
and that an appropriate legislative response should allow the punishable course of 
conduct to remain similarly fluid.64 In cognizance of this principle, it permits the 
punishable acts to take place either online or in person, severing the distinction between 
traditional stalking and cyberstalking. This allowance makes Wyoming's statute the only 
law in this brief survey that would likely punish Liam Y ouens' s covert online 
surveillance.65 Moreover, it is composed broadly enough that it might attach to Cassidy's 
Twitter rants66 and Stipe's "cyberstalking by proxy."67 In Wyoming, stalking is a 
misdemeanor. 68 
sentence-even ifthe individual has committed five prior offenses-of sixty days in prison. N.C. GEN. 
STAT. ANN.§ 14-196.3 (West 2000). 
62 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN.§§ 11.41.260, 11.41.270 (West 2006); WYO. STAT. ANN.§ 6-2-506 
(1977). 
63 WYO. STAT. ANN.§ 6-2-506 (1977). 
64 !d. 
65 Wright, supra note 12. 
66 Sengupta, supra note 17. 
67 Black, supra note 17. 
68 WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-506 (1977). 
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A fmal group of state statutes attempt to address cyberstalking without utilizing 
either cyberstalking or traditional stalking language.69 For example~ Vermont's most 
closely applicable statute makes it a crime to~ "with intent to terrify, intimidate, threaten, 
harass or annoy," make contact with another and 
(i) make[] any request~ suggestion or proposal which is obscene, lewd, 
lascivious or indecent; (ii) threaten[] to inflict injury or physical harm to 
the person or property of any person; or (iii) disturb[], or attempt[] to 
disturb, by repeated anonymous telephone calls or other electronic 
communications, whether or not conversation ensues. 70 
Despite the absence of specific stalking or cyberstalking terminology,71 the statute's 
language reflects that of many other states, and would probably apply both to Cassidy's 
Twitter harassment72 and to Stipe's "cyberstalking by proxy."73 It would likely not, 
however, implicate either Jake Baker and Arthur Gonda74 or Liam Youens/5 because it 
requires the individual to make contact with the victim.76 Given the statute's similarity to 
those of other states, it is perhaps strange that a conviction under this statute exposes the 
defendant to a maximum of merely three months of imprisonment and a fine of 
$250.0077-a true disparity when viewed in light of other states' responses.78 
69 See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN.§ 18.2-60 (2002); 13 VT. STAT. ANN.§ 1027 (2011). 
70 13 VT. STAT. ANN.§ 1027 (2011). 
71 Vermont's law does, however, contain an interesting jurisdictional provision: "An offense committed ... 
as set forth in this section shall be considered to have been committed at either the place where the 
telephone call or calls originated or at the place where the communication or communications or calls were 
received." !d. This language is strange, however, for the following reason. According to a plain reading 
of the provision, when the crime's setting is based on the "origination," rather than the "receipt" of a 
message, only a telephone call may form the basis of jurisdiction. If the message was created on a 
computer, the only place where a crime may be committed is where the message was received. Though no 
fmdings state so explicitly, this discrepancy may be an attempt to avoid the problem of states prosecuting 
out-of-state residents who contact victims within the state. Then again, it is difficult to see why that 
rationale would not extend to telephone communications as well as computer communications. 
72 Sengupta, supra note 17. 
73 Black, supra note 17. 
74 U.S. v. Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d 1492 (6th Cir. 1997). 
75 Wright, supra note 12. 
76 13 VT. STAT. ANN.§ 1027 (2011). 
77 13 VT. STAT. ANN.§ 1027 (2011). 
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This brief survey of state cyberstalking approaches exhibits that the states have 
different opinions about the harms that cyberstalking presents, and different approaches 
in addressing them. And while these laws do contain valuable provisions that the federal 
government would be wise to adopt, the significant overlap between them creates a web 
of inconsistency that, as a public policy matter, should render them unenforceable. 79 The 
Internet landscape is too devoid of cognizable boundaries to allow individual states to 
carve out wide prohibitions. 
B. The State Approach Violates the Dormant Commerce Clause 
Not only are the inconsistencies in the state-law approach problematic from a 
public policy perspective, but these inconsistencies also render the state statutes violative 
of the Dormant Connnerce Clause. As a general matter, the Dormant Connnerce Clause 
"is the principle that state and local laws are unconstitutional if they place an undue 
burden on interstate commerce. "80 If a law does not discriminate against out-of-staters, 
then the court employs a balancing test first articulated in Pike v. Brace Church, Inc. 81 
According to this test, a facially nondiscriminatory law that regulates a legitimate local 
interest and has only incidental effects on interstate connnerce "will be upheld unless the 
78 In Illinois, cyberstalking is a class 4 felony. 720 ILL. CoMP. STAT.§ 5/12-7.5 (2011). Under Illinois law, 
a class 4 felony is punishable by a sentence of"not less than one year and not more than three years." 6A 
Ill. Prac., Criminal Practice & Procedure§ 28:6.40 (2nd ed.). In Mississippi and North Carolina, as noted, 
the maximum sentences are five years and sixty days, respectively. Supra note 61. In Rhode Island, the 
sentence can be as long as two years. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN.§ 11-52-4.2 (West 2008). 
79 For a similar view on the "smorgasbord'' of state cyberstalking law, see Harry A. Valetk, Mastering the 
Dark Arts a/Cyberspace: A Quest for Sound Internet Safety Policies, 2004 STAN. TECH. L. REv. 2, 70-77 
(2004). 
80 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 419 (Vicki Been et al. eds., 3d 
ed.2006) 
81 397 u.s. 137 (1970). 
12 
burden imposed upon such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local 
benefits. "82 
As commentators have noted, however, the Dormant Commerce Clause "does not 
end with the Pike Test."83 State laws may also be struck down on the bases of 
"extraterritoriality" or "inconsistent obligations."84 The "extraterritoriality" doctrine was 
central to the Supreme Court's decision in Healy v. Beer Inst., Inc. 85 At issue in Healy 
was a Connecticut statute that required out-of-state beer shippers to affirm that their 
prices were no higher than prices in the surrounding states. 86 The Court surveyed its 
extraterritoriality decisions, finding that the Dormant Commerce Clause invalidated state 
laws that regulated commerce taking place wholly outside of the state. 87 In such a case, 
it did not matter whether the statute's "extraterritorial reach was intended by the 
legislature. "88 More important were the practical effects of the regulation, and the 
statute's potential interaction with other states' legitimate statutory regimes.89 Because 
the affirmation statute had "the impermissible practical effect of controlling commercial 
activity wholly outside Connecticut," the Court invalidated it.90 
State laws may also violate the Dormant Commerce Clause in another-and not 
entirely unrelated-way.91 If a law has the potential to "subject an area of interstate 
82 !d. at 142. 
83 Chi Pann, The Dormant Commerce Clause and State Regulation of the Internet: Are Laws Protecting 
Minors From Sexual Predators Different From Those Protecting Minors From Sexually Explicit 
Materials? 2005 DUKE L. & TECH. REv. 0008. (2005). 
84 Id 
85 491 u.s. 324 (1989). 
86 Id at 324. 
87 !d. at 336 (citing Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 642-43 (1982)). 
88 Healy, 491 U.S. at 336. 
89 Id at 336-37. 
9o Id 
91 See Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens of Port of Phila., to the Use of the Soc' y for the Relief of Distressed Pilots, 
Their Widows and Children, 53 U.S. 299 (1851). 
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commerce to inconsistent state regulation," the Dormant Commerce Clause is violated.92 
This principle has its roots in early Commerce Clause analysis.93 In Cooley, the Court 
noted that "[w]hatever subjects of this power are in their nature national, or admit only of 
one uniform system, or plan of regulation, may justly be said to be of such a nature as to 
require exclusive legislation by Congress."94 The Court thus recognized that some 
conduct, by its very nature, requires a uniform set of laws, only appropriately provided by 
Congress.95 
Of the three tests, the Pike Test is the most clearly defined, and is generally 
accepted amongst commentators. 96 Beyond that, however, disputes arise. Some 
persuasively argue that the extraterritoriality and inconsistent obligations bases are 
merely considerations under the Pike test.97 Meanwhile, others maintain that those tests 
are distinct from the Pike test, and are independently sufficient to invalidate state laws. 98 
A third contingent reads the jurisprudence as endorsing two of the above three tests. 99 
92 Pann, supra note 83, at 9 (citing Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959) (striking down 
a state highway regulation); S. Pac. Co. v. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761 (1945) (striking down a state railroad 
regulation)). 
93 Cooley, 53 U.S. 299. 
94 Id at 319. 
95 See id. 
96 Pann, supra note 83, at 10. 
97 For instance, Goldsmith and Sykes present a compelling argument that the "real concern underlying the 
extraterritoriality and inconsistent-regulations prongs of dormant Commerce Clause analysis is not out-of-
state effects and nonunifonnity per se, but rather whether the out-of-state burdens of a regulation outweigh 
its local benefits." Jack L. Goldsmith & Alan 0. Sykes, The Internet and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 
110 YALEL.J. 785,827 (2001). 
98 Pann, supra note 83, at 10. 
99 Michael W. Loudenslager, although acknowledging the three doctrines do at least nominally exist in the 
jurisprudence, notes that courts have treated the "inconsistent obligations" test "as effectively a preemption 
analysis." Michael W. Loudenslager, Allowing Another Policeman on the Iriformation Superhighway: State 
Interests and Federalism on the Internet in the Face of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 17 BYU J. PUB. L. 
191, 230 (2003). Loudenslager recognizes the Pike balancing test and, relying heavily on Healy, the 
extraterritoriality analysis as the two bases for invalidating nondiscriminatory state laws under the Dormant 
Commerce Clause. Id at 213-17. Peter C. Felmy goes in a different direction, suggesting that the 
"extraterritoriality" rationale be separated from Dormant Commerce Clause analysis altogether. Peter C. 
Felmy, Beyond the Reach of the States: The Dormant Commerce Clause, Extraterritorial State Legislation, 
and the Concerns of Federalism, 55 ME. L. REv. 467 (2003). 
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Despite the confusion, these tests clearly inform modern Dormant Commerce Clause 
analysis, and all three have been used to evaluate state laws that regulate Internet use, 
n1ost notably in American Libraries Ass 'n v. Pataki. 100 Because the statute at issue in 
Pataki resembles the cyberstalking statutes at issue here, the Pataki decision serves as an 
important touchstone for the Dormant Commerce Clause analysis of state cyberstalking 
laws. 
Pataki pitted a broad array of interest groups and organizations against the 
Governor and the Attorney General ofNew York. 101 At issue was the constitutionality of 
a New York law102 that made it a felony to knowingly transmit to a minor, using a 
computer, material that is hannful to minors. 103 The court concluded that the statute 
violated the Dormant Commerce Clause on all three of the grounds detailed above-the 
Pike balancing test, extraterritoriality, and inconsistent obligations.104 
First, the court addressed the extraterritoriality defect of the New York law. 105 
The court noted that the "nature of the Internet makes it impossible to restrict the effects 
of the New York Act to conduct occurring within New York."106 Non-New Yorkers, in 
other words, could not prevent their transmissions from entering New York. This made 
them potentially subject to the New York statute'sjurisdiction.107 As a result, the statute 
100 969 F. Supp. 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). 
101 These organizations included: American Library Association, Freedom to Read Foundation, Inc., New 
York Library Association, Westchester Library System, American Booksellers Foundation For Free 
Expression, Association of American Publishers, Bibliobytes, Magazine Publishers of America, Interactive 
Digital Software Association, Public Access Networks Corporation, ECHO, New York City Net, Art on the 
Net, Peacefrre, and the American Civil Liberties Union. !d. at 161-62. 
102 !d. at 161. The law at issue was N.Y. Penal Law§ 235.21. 
103 !d. at 163. 
104 !d. at 169; see Pann, supra note 83. 
105 Pataki, 969 F.Supp. at 173. 
106 ld at 177. 
107 Pann, supra note 60, at 13. 
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had the practical effect of regulating conduct wholly outside of the state. 108 This 
encroachment, the court held, rendered the New York Act "per se violative of the 
[Dormant] Commerce Clause."109 
Next, the court analyzed the law under the Pike balancing test. 110 While the court 
accepted that protecting children against pedophilia was a legitimate state interest, it held 
that any benefit derived from the law was outweighed by its burden on interstate 
commerce.111 For one, the statute would not-indeed could not-have an effect on 
international communications.112 Further, the effective prosecution of the statute would 
require pursuing out-of-staters, and that process would be "beset with practical 
difficulties."113 And because New York had other laws aimed at preventing similar 
harms, any benefits would be confmed to the narrow class of cases falling outside the 
scope of existing laws. 114 The court balanced this relatively minor benefit against the 
law's significant burdens on interstate commerce, including the "extreme burden" on 
interstate commerce, the "chilling effect" on out of state Internet users, and the 
"excessive" costs of enforcement. 115 Because, on balance, the burdens of the law on 
interstate commerce outweighed its local benefits, the law failed the Pike test and 
violated the Dormant Commerce Clause. 116 
108 See id 
109 Pataki, 969 F.Supp at 177. 
llo Id 
111 !d. at 177-178. 
112 Id at 178. 
113 Id 
114 !d. at 179. 
115 Pann, supra note 83, at 15 (citing Pataki, 969 F.Supp. at 179-80). 
116 Pataki, 969 F.Supp. at 181. 
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Finally, the court decided that the statute was invalid because it risked imposing 
upon individuals inconsistent obligations.117 The court, channeling Cooley, noted, 
The courts have long recognized that certain types of commerce demand 
consistent treatment and are therefore susceptible to regulation only on a 
national level. The Internet represents one of those areas; effective 
regulation will require national, and more likely global, cooperation. 
Regulation by any single state can only result in chaos, because at least 
some states will likely enact laws subjecting Internet users to conflicting 
obligations. 118 
As an illustration of the difficulties that would attend the upholding of the law, the court 
referred to the legal standard upon which conviction would tum. 119 The material sent 
must be "harmful to minors," which was defined, in part, as being "patently offensive to 
prevailing standards in the adult community as a whole."120 The problem with this is that 
"there is no single 'prevailing community standard' in the United States."121 Therefore, 
to avoid the possibility of prosecution, the Internet user must either comply with the most 
stringent regulation or forego communication entirely. 122 Because the risk of imposing 
inconsistent obligations is impermissible under the Dormant Commerce Clause, the court 
struck down the law. 123 
In the wake of Pataki, other courts struck down similar laws, largely employing 
the same rationale as the Pataki court.124 Not all courts, however, were persuaded. The 
courts in the latter category-overwhelmingly (and perhaps unsurprisingly) state 
117 !d. 
118/d. 
119 !d. at 182. 
120 !d. 
121 !d. 
122 Pataki, 969 F.Supp. at 183. 
123 !d. 
124 See Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Johnson, 194 F.3d 1149 (lOth Cir. 1999); Cyberspace Commc'ns, Inc. 
v. Engler, 142 F. Supp. 2d 827 (E.D.Mich. 2001); Am. Booksellers Found. v. Dean, 342 F.3d 96 (2d Cir. 
2003); PSINet, Inc. v. Chapman, 362 F.3d 227 (4th Cir. 2004). 
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courts-drew distinctions between the statute at issue in Pataki and those at issue in their 
cases, concluding that their statutes satisfied the Dormant Commerce Clause. 125 
Representative of those cases is a California decision, Hatch v. Superior Court. 126 
Hatch involved a statute similar to that in Pataki, making it "a criminal offense to send, 
by any means, specified harmful matter to a minor 'with the intent or for the purpose of 
seducing a minor. "'127 Despite the similarities to the statute in Pataki, the California law 
survived its Dormant Commerce Clause challenge.128 The court distinguished Pataki on 
two grounds. First, the court focused on the "intent-to-seduce" requirement. In the 
court's view, 
a ban on communication of specified matter to a minor for purposes of 
seduction can only affect the rights of the very narrow class of adults who 
intend to engage in sex with minors. We have found no case which gives 
such intentions or the communications employed in realizing them 
protection under the dormant Commerce Clause.129 
In other words, because the commerce in question was not legal under the laws of 
California, the Dormant Commerce Clause should not apply. 130 
Second, the court held that the statute would not likely affect interstate commerce, 
citing California penal statutes that prevent punishment for wholly extraterritorial 
offenses.131 The court thus upheld the statute.132 
Hatch and similar cases, 133 however, were wrongly decided. The distinctions the 
Hatch court drew from the statute in Pataki are, under scrutiny, untenable. The Hatch 
125 See Hatch v. Sup. Ct., 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d 453 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000); People v. Hsu, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 184 
(Cal. Ct. App. 2000); State v. Heckel, 24 P.3d404 (Wash. 2001). 
126 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d 453 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000). 
127 !d. at 459 (citing CAL. PENAL CODE§ 288.2(a)). 
128 /d. 
129 !d. at 471. 
130 See id. 
131 !d. at 473. 
132 Hatch, 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 473. The Hsu court utilized this same argument as well. Hsu, 99 Cal. Rptr. 
2d at 191-92. 
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court's first error was the weight that it afforded the statute's mens rea requirement. The 
reason that the intent element was important, it declared, was because it narrowed the 
range of banned conduct-it would, in the court's words, "only affect the rights of the 
very narrow class of adults who intend to engage in sex with minors. "134 Echoing that 
sentiment, the Hsu court noted that "it is difficult to conceive of any legitimate commerce 
that would be burdened by penalizing the transmission of harmful sexual material known 
to minors in order to seduce them."135 These courts erred in their failure to recognize that 
the legitimacy or illegitimacy-that is, the legality or illegality-of commerce is itself a 
legal conclusion, dependent upon the particular law that a court is referencing. 
For example, consider the statute at issue in Hatch and Hsu, which prohibited 
sending harmful material to a minor "with the intent or for the purpose of seducing a 
minor."136 Because states have different ages of consent, an adult in one state could be 
seducing someone online whom he legitimately believes to be of age in his state-and in 
his own state, he would not be committing a crime, because the object of his seduction, 
by his own state's law, would not be a minor. But because his target happens to reside in 
California-a fact he may have no way of knowing-he would be subject to prosecution 
in California. Because in these cases the legitimacy of commerce depends upon 
standards particular to state law, the commerce's legitimacy or illegitimacy will vary 
from state to state. Therefore, the courts' reliance on mens rea was an ineffective 
distinction from the result in Pataki. 
133 See, e.g., Hsu, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 184; Heckel, 143 Wash.2d 824. 
134 Hatch, 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 471. 
135 Hsu, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 190 (emphasis added). Hsu involved the same statute that was at issue in 
Hatch. !d. at 982. 
136 CAL. PENAL CODE§ 288.2(a). 
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The Hatch court's second error was its reliance on California's general bar on 
"punishment for wholly extraterritorial offenses"137 as an indication that California would 
not pursue out-of-state offenders for these types of crimes. As Alex McDonald notes, 
California courts have repeatedly upheld convictions of individuals for crimes whose 
results occurred in California, but whose conduct took place wholly outside of 
California. 138 An even more recent example, post-dating McDonald's work, confirms 
this point. In People v. Betts, the Supreme Court of California held that "a state may 
exercise jurisdiction over criminal acts that take place outside of the state if the results of 
the crime are intended to, and do, cause harm within the state."139 So even though it 
might be true that California will not pursue out-of-state offenders for wholly 
extraterritorial crimes, it is equally true that the conduct at issue in Hatch and Hsu was 
not wholly extraterritorial, because its results took place within the state.140 
Moreover, even if it may be true that "there is no reason to suppose California 
would attempt to impose its policies on other states,"141 statutes that regulate 
extraterritorially are "invalid regardless of whether the statute's extraterritorial reach was 
137 Hatch, 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 473. 
138 Alex C. McDonald, Dissemination of Harmful Matter to Minors Over the Internet, 12 SETON HALL 
CONST. L.J. 163 (2001). As MacDonald notes: 
In Ex Parte Hedley [31 Cal. 108 (1866)L the California Supreme Court upheld the 
embezzlement conviction in California under California law of the defendant, who in 
Nevada drew checks on his employer's account and sent them to California to be cashed. 
In People v. Sansom [37 Cal. App. 435 (C.A. Sec. Dis. Cal. 1918)], the California court 
upheld the forgery (uttering) conviction in California under California law of the 
defendant, who forged a check in Mexico and sent it to his agent in California for deposit 
in an Arizona bank. Receipt in California of an Internet communication sent from 
another state seems indistinguishable from receipt in California of a forged check sent 
from another state. It therefore appears that California criminal jurisdiction permits 
prosecution in California under section 288.2(b) California Penal Code of a person who 
sends an Internet communication from another state that is received in California, and 
otherwise satisfies the elements of the statute. 
!d. at 213-14. 
139 People v. Betts, 23 Cal. Rptr. 3d 138, 142 (Cal. 2005). 
140 See Hatch v. Sup. Ct., 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d 453 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000); People v. Hsu, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 184 
(Cal. Ct. App. 2000). 
141 Hatch, 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 473. 
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intended by the legislature."142 Furthermore, the statute must be considered in light of 
what "effect would arise if not one, but many or every, State adopted similar 
legislation."143 While it might be true that California would not pursue out-of-state 
offenders, as a logical matter, if at least one state permits prosecution of out-of-state 
conduct, then the entire Internet community is subject to inconsistent obligations. The 
user will have to abide by the laws of his state as well as the laws of the state that extends 
its reach beyond its geographical boundaries. Therefore, under Healy, even if California 
truly did not intend to assert its extraterritorial reach, the statute would still be invalid.144 
As a result of the weaknesses in the Hatch line of cases, Pataki emerges as the 
more persuasive authority both from a legal and public policy perspective. The principles 
that drove the decision in Pataki are highly relevant to the legitimacy of the state 
statutory approach to cyberstalking. Consider, for example, a hypothetical Dormant 
Commerce Clause analysis of the Illinois cyberstalking statute, applying the principles at 
work in Pataki. 145 
C. A Dormant Commerce Clause Analysis of Illinois's Cyberstalking Statute 
First, we must consider the extraterritoriality doctrine. Under Healy, a statute 
"that directly controls commerce occurring wholly outside the boundaries of a State" is 
invalid under the Dormant Commerce Clause. 146 If the practical effect of the law is to 
control conduct in other states, it is invalid, regardless of the legislature's intent. 147 
Illinois's law contains no geographic limitation; its provisions apply to all electronic 
142 Healy v. Beer Inst., Inc., 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989). The Hsu court betrays its ignorance of this critical 
point by noting that the statute "makes no reference to place of performance, so courts must assume that the 
Legislature did not intend to regulate conduct taking place outside the state." Hsu, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 192. 
143 Healy. 491 U.S. at 336-37. 
144 !d. at 336. 
145 Recall Illinois's cyberstalking-specific statute. Supra section II.A. 
146 Healy, 491 U.S. at 336. 
147 Id 
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communication, without reference to where the sender physically resides. 148 Under a 
plain reading of the law, an individual outside of Illinois could initiate online contact with 
an individual in Illinois and violate any of the three provisions of the law, subjecting 
himself to prosecution in Illinois. Perhaps the Illinois law's fmal provision draws this 
into clearest relief: 149 a person who creates a web page about another person does not 
directly communicate with his victim; rather, he displays his message to the Internet 
community at large, in whatever state the recipient may reside. Because the website's 
creator does not have control over where his website is accessible, he must either comply 
with Illinois's unique law or forgo his communication entirely. This is precisely the 
choice to which the extraterritoriality doctrine is directed, and as a result the Illinois 
statute violates the Dormant Commerce Clause. 
If the Pataki court's application of the Pike test is accepted, it will also doom 
Illinois's statute. As mentioned, the Pike test involves a two-step inquiry. 15° First, the 
court must examine the legitimacy of the state's interest. It is difficult to contest the 
validity of the interest here, and a court would most likely assume its validity. Next, the 
court must determine whether the burden to interstate commerce outweighs the state's 
interest.151 It was at this point that the Pataki court balked, and the court's arguments 
resonate in this context as well. First, the "practical difficulties'' involved with 
enforcement of the statute reduce the significance of the local benefit-for example, 
Illinois could not prevent online harassment from international sources. It also might be 
cost prohibitive to prosecute individuals whose only contact with the state "occurs via the 
148 720 ILL. COMP. STAT.§ 5/12-7.5 (2011). 
149 See supra text accompanying notes 37-40. 
150 Pike v. Brace Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). 
151 !d. 
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Internet."152 Furthermore, the "chilling effect" discussed in Pataki is also present here, 
and "Internet users will steer clear of the Act by significant margin," thereby burdening 
interstate commerce.153 For these reasons, the Illinois law would probably be invalidated 
under the Pike test as well. 
Finally, the Illinois statute violates the Dormant Commerce Clause on the basis of 
the inconsistent obligations it imposes on Internet users. Every state espouses different 
values, and these values are inevitably reflected in the state's legal code. Illinois's 
statute-and in particular subsection (a)(S)-is unique.154 It is not an unreasonable 
provision, but at this point, Illinois is the only state to employ such language. 155 In every 
other state-assuming the language in other states' statutes will not be stretched beyond 
cognizance-such conduct is legal. But an Internet user creating or maintaining such an 
Internet site in any other state must be aware not only of the laws of his own state, but 
also of this Illinois law. These are the very inconsistent obligations that violate the 
Dormant Commerce Clause. 156 
This Comment does not argue that the state statutes are, by and large, poorly 
drafted, or that they are wrongheaded responses to the social ills wrought by 
cyberstalking. Instead, this Comment argues that a state-by -state approach to 
cyberstalking reflects poor public policy and violates the Dormant Commerce Clause. 
These laws reach beyond their states' boundaries, they impose inconsistent obligations 
upon Internet users, and by and large they impose a greater burden on interstate 
152 Id at 178. 
153 !d. at 179. 
154 720 ILL. COMP. STAT.§ 5/12-7.5 (2011). 
155 See id. 
156 Here we again witness the overlap between the extraterritoriality and inconsistent obligations doctrines. 
While this overlap exposes the tu1certainty of current law, it does not tu1dermine the legal conclusions 
derived from the doctrines. 
23 
commerce than is justified by the harm they target. In the "decentralized, global 
communications medium" 157 that is the Internet, these scattered laws are an incomplete 
and unsatisfying solution. Because cyberstalking and the harms that it creates routinely 
"travel" across state boundaries, sound jurisprudence and public policy suggest that an 
appropriate response to cyberstalking is a unified federal system. The ideal federal 
approach will utilize the best parts of the state statutes-like Illinois's creation-or-
maintenance-of-a-website provision and Wyoming's implicit recognition that much 
stalking activity today vacillates fluidly between online and offline conduct-and 
simultaneously remedy the state-by-state approach's significant shortcomings. 
III. The Current Federal Approach is Lacking 
Today, three federal statutes apply to adult cyberstalking behavior. 158 One 
provision of one statute rsg is directed specifically at cyberstalking; the others are slightly 
different statutes that courts have adapted to cyberstalking as a matter of convenience.160 
As a practical matter, however, the cyberstalking statute and other applicable statutes 
constitute an inefficient and substandard regime. The following section describes the 
existing statutes and addresses their respective deficiencies. 
A. 18 U.S.C. § 2261A 
157 Am. Libraries Ass,n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 164 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). 
158 See 18 U.S.C. § 2261A (2006); 18 U.S.C. § 875 (2006); 47 U.S.C. § 223 (2006); 18 U.S.C. § 2425 
(2006). Another statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2425, prohibits the transmission of certain information to a minor 
with the "intent to entice, encourage, offer, or solicit any person to engage in any sexual activity for which 
any person can be charged with a criminal offense." ld While this statute certainly has value, it is aimed 
at a different harm than the harm discussed in this Comment, and is outside of its scope. For a discussion 
of the application of cyberstalking law to children, see Kimberly Wingteung Seto, How Should Legislation 
Deal With Children as the Victims and Perpetrators ofCyberstalking?, 9 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 67 
(2002). 
159 18 U.S.C. § 2261A. 
160 18 u.s.c. § 875; 47 u.s.c. § 223; 18 u.s.c. § 2425. 
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This statute is the federal government's primary vehicle for combating stalking 
and cyberstalking. It contains two provisions, one dedicated to each. Section (1)is a 
fairly broad physical stalking statute. 161 It serves its limited purpose well, but standing 
alone it is not a tool to combat cyberstalking. 
Section (2) is the federal government's cyberstalking provision. 162 Given its 
importance, it is reproduced below, in full. 
Whoever 
(2) with the intent--
(A) to kill, injure, harass, or place under surveillance with 
intent to kill, injure, harass, or intimidate, or cause 
substantial emotional distress to a person in another State 
or tribal jurisdiction or within the special maritime and 
territorial jurisdiction of the United States; or 
(B) to place a person in another State or tribal jurisdiction, 
or within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of 
the United States, in reasonable fear of the death of, or 
serious bodily injury to--
(i) that person; 
(ii) a member of the immediate family (as defmed 
in section 115) of that person; or 
(iii) a spouse or intimate partner of that person; 
uses the mail, any interactive computer service, or any facility of 
interstate or foreign commerce to engage in a course of conduct 
that causes substantial emotional distress to that person or places 
that person in reasonable fear of the death of, or serious bodily 
injury to, any of the persons described in clauses (i) through (iii) of 
subparagraph (B).163 
For reasons explained below, this provision has been used sparingly. But when 
the government has employed it, it has proved effective. In United States v. Bowker, the 
161 18 U.S.C. § 2261A(l). 
Whoever ... travels in interstate or foreign commerce ... with the intent to kill, injure, harass, or 
place under surveillance with intent to kill, injure, harass, or intimidate another person, and in the 
course of, or as a result or, such travel places that person in reasonable fear of the death or, or 
serious bodily injlll)' to, or causes substantial emotional distress to that person, a member of the 
immediate family of that person, or the spouse or intimate partner of that person. 
Id 
162 18 U.S.C. § 2261A(2). 
163 !d. 
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victim, Tina Knight, began receiving threatening and vulgar emails from several different 
email addresses. 164 An initial FBI investigation of the conununications revealed Erik 
Bowker as the sender, and Knight procured a cease and desist order. 165 Bowker, 
however, continued to send threatening e-mails, phone calls, and letters both to Knight 
and to her family, suggesting that he would use violence against her. 166 Furthermore, 
Bowker traveled from his residence in Ohio to hers in West Virginia to take photographs 
of her place of work and to steal her mail.167 The court found that Bowker "intended to 
instill in Knight a fear of death or serious bodily hann through use of the mails and other 
facilities of interstate commerce," and that he was guilty under§ 2261A(2). 168 
In United States v. Rose, a California man, Richard Rose, was accused of 
cyberstalking a Mhmesota woman, Lois Fischer. 169 The two had met online while 
playing a card game, and a romance blossomed. 170 They exchanged "cyber vows" and 
agreed to meet in California, while Fischer was on a business trip. 171 When the time 
came, however, Fischer got cold feet, and refused to meet Rose. 172 Rose tracked her 
down to her hotel and called her on the telephone. 173 But when Fischer's husband 
answered (Fischer had told him she was widowed), Rose became enraged, and responded 
by sending her a barrage of vulgar and threatening e-mails, including death threats to 
164 372 F.3d 365, 371 (2004). 
165 !d. at 372. 
166 !d. 
167 Id 
168 !d. The court also found Bowker guilty under 18 U.S.C. § 2261A(1), 47 U.S.C. § 223(a)(1)(C), and 18 
U.S.C. § 1708. !d. at 370, 388. 
169 315 F.3d 956 (8th Cir. 2003). 
170 ld at 957. 
171 !d. 
172 !d. 
173 !d. 
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Fischer's children.174 Rose also posted pictures of her children online, "along with their 
full names, address, and telephone nun1ber, on web sites soliciting sexual activity."175 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, Rose was convicted under§ 2261A(2). 176 
One recent case is also worthy of note. Shawn Memarian pleaded guilty to 
cyberstalking under§ 2261A(l) in early 2009.177 Memarian had dated his victim-a 
Missouri, then Colorado, resident-for approximately one month.178 After the 
relationship ended, Memarian began a wide-ranging course of online harassment.179 He 
sent her "more than 75 threatening e-mails."180 Worse, Memarian, posing as his victim, 
created false personal ads describing the victim as a "sex freak," which he posted on 
MySpace and Facebook.181 In all, approximately thirty men responded to the ads, some 
showing up to the victim's house at night. 182 What is notable about Memarian's plea is 
that it might suggest that his latter conduct-"cyberstalking by proxy"183-falls within 
the reach of§ 2261A(2). But given that there was no trial-and that Memarian's sending 
of seventy-five threatening e-mails alone would likely have been sufficient to garner a 
conviction under§ 2261A(2)-concluding so may be premature. 
Indeed, some commentators are convinced that§ 2261A(2) would not cover 
"cyberstalking by proxy," like that of Jebidiah James Stipe.184 According to Naomi 
Harlin Goodno, for all the good§ 2261A(2) does, it still fails to "squarely deal with 
174 !d. 
175 Rose, 315 F.3d at 957. 
176 !d. at 956. Rose was also convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c). !d. 
177 John F. Wood, New Release: Office ofthe United States Attorney, Western District of Missouri. Jan. 7, 
2009, http://www.justice.gov/criminaVcybercrime/memarianPlea.pdf. 
178 !d. at2. 
179 !d. 
180 !d. 
181 ld 
182 ld 
183 Sullivan, supra note 17. 
184 Black, supra note 17. 
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situations where the cyberstalker pretends to be the victim and encourages third parties to 
innocently harass the victim, such as posting sexual invitations on a message board in the 
name of the victim to dupe third parties to respond."185 Given the increasing prevalence 
of such conduct, an effective federal statute should clearly encompass this harm. 
An even more recent case, mentioned above, adds an interesting twist to the 
general applicability and efficacy of§ 2261A. William Lawrence Cassidy was charged 
with cyberstalking under section§ 2261A(2)(A) for a series of Twitter and blog postings 
directed at Buddhist figure Alyce Zeoli.186 Under a series of aliases, Cassidy unleashed a 
virulent barrage of messages directed at Zeoli.187 These messages ranged from pointed 
religious criticism ("(A.Z.) is a demonic force who tries to destroy Buddhism") to sinister 
and thinly veiled threats ("Rain tomorrow should cover the tracks"). 188 In the end, 
Cassidy published about 8,000 tweets, most directed towards Zeoli. 189 
In December, the District Court for the District of Maryland dismissed Cassidy's 
indictment, holding that, as applied to Cassidy,§ 2261A(2)(A) was an unconstitutional 
infringement on his First Amendment right to free speech.190 In reaching its conclusion, 
the court relied on a few important propositions. First, the court analogized Twitter to a 
Colonial-era bulletin board.191 Like a bulletin board, which can be ignored simply by not 
walking over to the board, Twitter allows users to ignore messages they do not want to 
view, by either "blocking" or "unfollowing" the sender of the offending messages. 192 
According to the court, this "is in sharp contrast to a telephone call, letter or e-mail 
185 Goodno, supra note 26, at 152. 
186 U.S. v. Cassidy, No. RWT 1I-091, 201 I WL 6260872 (D. Mass. Dec. I5, 201 I). 
187 !d. 
188 Id app. A. 
189 Sengupta, supra note 17. 
19° Cassidy, 20II WL 6260872, at* IO. 
191 Id at *3. 
192 Id at *4. 
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specifically addressed to and directed at another person, and that difference ... is 
fundamental to the First Amendment analysis in this case."193 Specifically, this 
distinction meant the difference between the presence and absence of an important 
government interest. 194 The Fourth Circuit has held, for instance, that in the context of a 
telephone harassment statute, the government does have a "strong and legitimate" 
interest.195 But because a Twitter user may disregard the offensive messages, that same 
government interest is not present. 
The second critical aspect of the case was that Zeoli is a prominent religious 
figure. Amici pointed out that Zeoli's own Twitter account has 17,221 followers, and she 
has produced instructional videos that have been viewed over 143,000 times.196 Because 
she is an "easily identifiable public figure that leads a religious sect," the statute 
implicated types of expression that the Supreme Court has consistently attempted to 
protect.197 
While at frrst blush the decision in this case casts doubts upon the continuing 
validity of§ 2261A(2)(A), Cassidy will not be the last word on this cyberstalking statute. 
For one, this as-applied holding is readily distinguishable, as most stalking cases do not 
involve prominent religious figures. Secondly, and possibly more critically, the court's 
bulletin board analogy fails to withstand scrutiny. Although the court's description of 
Twitter was accurate, the court glossed over the fact that Zeoli could not actually easily 
ignore Cassidy's messages. She did attempt to ignore his tweets, but each time she 
193 Id 
194 ld. 
195 Id at 117 (citing Thone v. Bailey~ 846 F.2d 241,243 (4th Cir. 1988)). 
196 Cassidy, 2011 WL 6260872, at *9 n.14. Indeed, one can watch her official enthronement as Jetsunma 
Akhon Lhamo, the reincarnation of an important Buddhist figure. Enthronement of Jetsunma Akhon 
Lhamo, http://www.tara.org/jetsunma-ahkon-lhamo/biography/ (last visited Jan. 2, 2012). 
197 Cassidy, 2011 WL 6260872, at *18. 
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blocked him, Cassidy created a new alias with which to harass Zeoli. 198 In all) Cassidy 
employed thirteen different usemames. 199 Thus, while Cassidy's speech was not quite as 
direct as a telephone call or e-mail, it is difficult to limit Twitter messages to the "public 
forum" designation, especially given the particular facts of the case. Given the 
importance of the bulletin board analogy to the court's disposition, it is puzzling that it 
chose to ignore this seemingly critical fact. 
A final shortcoming of§ 2261A(2) is its overly cautious reach. The statute's 
applicability is significantly narrowed by the requirement that the offender and the victim 
be in different states. This restriction appears designed to protect against a potential 
Commerce Clause challenge, but it is an unnecessary restriction because the use of the 
Internet alone is enough to satisfy the Commerce Clause.2°0 By including this limitation, 
Congress effectively constrained prosecution to a small subset of potential cases. The 
limitation, for instance, would preclude prosecution in a case like Jebidiah James Stipe's, 
if Stipe had been in the same state as his victim. That Stipe's cyberstalking conduct 
could go unpunished merely by virtue of an invisible and meaningless state line borders 
on the absurd. Furthermore, in light of the deficiencies in the state approach, it becomes 
clearer still that a proper federal statute must have the maximum possible breadth. 
B. 18 U.S.C. § 875 
198 Kashmir Hill, You Have a Constitutional Right to Stalk and Harass People on Twitter, FORBES, Dec. 16, 
20 II, http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/20 11112/16/you-have-a-constitutional-right-to-stalk-and-
harass-people-on-twitter/. 
199 Cassidy, 2011 WL 6260872, at *3 n.7. 
200 See U.S. v. MacEwan, 445 F.3d 237 (3d Cir. 2006) (holding that the Internet is an instrumentality of 
interstate commerce, and Congress has the Commerce Clause power to regulate the transmission of child 
pornography even if transmission did not cross state lines). Furthermore, courts' treatments of the next 
statute, 18 U.S.C. § 875, underscore the point. Section 875 contains no such limiting language, and courts 
have held that threatening Internet communications can be prosecuted even where the defendant and the 
recipient reside in the same state. See U.S. v. Kammersell, 196 F.3d 1137 (lOth Cir. 1999); U.S. v. 
Morales, 272 F.3d 284 (5th Cir. 2001). 
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This statute, entitled "Interstate communications," contains a provision that in 
certain cases applies to cyberstalking.201 Subsection (c) prohibits communication 
containing a threat. 202 This provision is infrequently applied, and has garnered only a few 
convictions of note. 203 The limitation is that the statute requires a "threat." The usual 
interpretation of a "true," or "credible threat," was expressed in United States v. 
Kelner,204 where the court held that a threat must be an "unequivocal, unconditional and 
specific expressions of intention immediately to inflict injury."205 This high threshold 
excludes a broad array of cyberstalking activity that does not convey such a narrowly 
construed menace. 206 
Unfortunately, at least one court has adopted an even more restrictive standard.207 
In United States v. Alkhabaz-the case that affirmed the dismissal of Jake Baker and 
Arthur Gonda's indictments under§ 875-the Sixth Circuit announced that to amount to 
a "threat," the communication ''must be such that a reasonable person ( 1) would take the 
statement as a serious expression of an intention to inflict bodily harm (the mens rea), and 
(2) would perceive such expression as being communicated to effect some change or 
achieve some goal through intimidation (the actus reus)."208 The dissent in Alkhabaz 
201 18 u.s.c. § 875. 
202 18 U.S.C. § 875(c). 
203 One such conviction came in an aforementioned case, United States v. Rose, 315 F.3d 956, 957 (2003). 
See also Kammersell, 196 F.3d I 137 (sending a bomb threat by instant message); Morales, 272 F.3d 284 
(entering Internet chat room and threatening to shoot and kill students at school); U.S. v. Johnson, 18 Fed. 
Appx 463 (9th Cir. 2000) (sending e-mail threats to kill judicial officer); U.S. v. Sutcliffe, 505 F.3d 944 
(9th Cir. 2007) (transmitting interstate threats to injure and transferring social security numbers of various 
targets on website); U.S. v. Newell, 309 F.3d 396 (6th Cir. 2002) (sending "harassing and threatening" e-
mails to ex-girlfriend); U.S. v. Scott, 42 Fed. Appx. 264 (lOth Cir. 2002) (sending threatening e-mails). 
204 534 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1976). 
205 !d. at 1027. 
206 For an argument that the "credible threaC' standard is outdated, see Joanna Lee Mishler, Cyberstalking: 
Can Communication via the Internet Constitute a Credible Threat, and Should an Internet Service Provider 
be Liable if it Does?, 17 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER& HIGH TECH. L.J. 115, 121-29 (2000). 
207 See U.S. v. Alkhabaz, 104 FJd 1492 (6th Cir. 1997). 
208 Id at 1495. 
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took strong issue with the majority's extrajudicial addition of an element into the 
statute.209 The judge noted that even though certain communications under§ 875 would 
satisfy the constitutional "threat" standard~ they would nonetheless be immune from 
prosecution because~ as here, they "were not made with the intent to realize a specific 
purpose through intimidation. "210 
A related problem with § 875 is that its language does not appear to allow a 
"course of conduct" to amount to a threat: the menace must be transmitted through one 
message.211 Given that much of the fear generated from cyberstalking is derived from 
continual contact, rather than a single isolated threat~ this statute's applicability is limited. 
Although§ 875 may be useful in certain egregious situations, it is not valuable in 
cyberstalking cases where the fear is supplied by the stalker's continual contact with the 
victim, rather than by the content of the messages themselves. 
c. 47 u.s.c. § 223 
In 2006, Congress amended this longstanding telephone harassment statute212-
enacted in 1934-''to ensure that e-mail messages sent via the Internet were covered by§ 
223."213 Today, "whoever ... makes a telephone call or utilizes a telecommunications 
device, whether or not conversation or communication ensues, without disclosing his 
identity and with intent to annoy, abuse, threaten, or harass any person" is guilty of 
209 /d. at 1506. 
210 ld 
2II 18 U.S.C. § 875(c). 
212 47 u.s.c. § 223 (2006). 
213 Goodno, supra note 26, at 148. 
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sending "obscene or harassing" communications.214 While this statute has proven useful 
in the past,215 several issues render it ineffective. 
First, it may be unconstitutional. The "intent-to-annoy" requirement has posed 
problems in similar statutes.216 In Coates v. City of Cincinnati, for example, the Supreme 
Court stuck down an ordinance that forbid residents to assemble in groups and comport 
themselves in an "annoying" manner.217 The Court found that the statute was 
unconstitutionally vague because conduct that "annoys some people does not annoy 
others.''218 Therefore, "no standard of conduct is specified at all."219 Similarly, in Bolles 
v. People, the court struck down a harassment statute that required the intent to "harass, 
annoy, or alarm" on the ground that it was facially overbroad. 220 According to the Court, 
forbidding annoying and alarming communications would render illegal discussing 
"anything that is of any significance . . . . The First Amendment is made of sterner 
stuff. ,221 
Only one court has ruled on the constitutionality of the mens rea in§ 233.222 In 
the aforementioned case of United States v. Bowker, the Sixth Circuit upheld the law?23 
In justifying its defense of the statute, the court read together the mens rea requirements 
to give them similar meanings.224 So while "annoy" alone may be unconstitutionally 
vague, the court held that when it is associated with words like "threaten" and "harass," 
214 47 U.S.C. § 223(a)(l)(C). 
215 It was, for example, used to garner a conviction in U.S. v. Bowker, 372 F.3d 365 (6th Cir. 2004), 
discussed in the text accompanying notes 220-23. 
216 See Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971); Bolles v. People, 189 Colo. 394 (1975). 
217 402 u.s. 611 (1971). 
218 /d. at 614. 
219 Id 
220 Bolles v. People, 189 Colo. 394, 399 (1975). 
221 Id at 398. 
222 U.S. v. Bowker, 372 F.3d 365 (6th Cir. 2004). 
223 /d. 
224 /d. at 382-83. 
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its meaning can be easily understood.225 The statutes at issue in Coates and Bolles) 
however, were not substantially different than the statute at issue in Bowker.226 Given 
this, and considering that the Bowker court is the only court thus far to address the issue 
in the context of§ 223, it would be rash to conclude that§ 233 passes constitutional 
muster. 
But even granting the provision constitutional satisfaction does not repair its 
other, and arguably more substantial, infirmities. Goodno isolates two important 
problems.227 First, the fact that the statute requires the communicator to be anonymous is 
problematic.228 This element, "without reason," prevents prosecution in cases where the 
victim knows the stalker.229 This problem seems especially weighty given that "[m]ore 
than fifty-nine percent of female stalking victims (and thirty percent of male stalking 
victims) are stalked by an intimate partner."230 Second, "the statute applies only to direct 
communications between the stalker and victim-for example, the statute would only be 
triggered when the cyberstalker sends an e-mail directly to the victim."231 Therefore, the 
statute would apply neither to Jebidiah James Stipe's "proxy cyberstalking,"232 nor to 
William Lawrence Cassidy's indirect Twitter harassment.233 These types of conduct are 
increasingly relevant, and that this statute fails to punish them is a major shortcoming. 
22s Id 
226 Compare 47 U.S.C. § 223 (2006) ("intent to annoy~ abuse, threaten, or harass any person"), with the 
statutes at issue in Coates, 402 U.S. at 612 ("conduct ... annoying to persons passing by") and Bolles, 189 
Colo. n. 1 ("intent to harass, annoy, or alarm another person''). 
227 Goodno, supra note 26, at 148. 
228 /d. 
229 !d. 
230 Laura Silverstein, The Double Edged Sword.· An Examination of the Global Positioning System, 
Enhanced 911, and the Internet and their Relationships to the Lives of Domestic Violence Victims and their 
Abusers, 13 BUFF. WOMEN'S L. J. 97, 120 (2006). 
231 Goodno, supra note 26, at 150. 
232 Black, supra note 17. 
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In sum, all three federal statutes that are applied to cyberstalking have 
deficiencies that render them ineffectual, both individually and in combination. While 
the jurisdictional expansiveness of§ 875 is better than its sharply delimited counterpart in 
§ 2261A(2), § 875's heightened "threat" threshold precludes its application in swaths of 
important cases. While § 223 's sprawling mens rea requirements-that certainly skirt, if 
not breach, constitutional limits-expand the potential convictions, its other limitations 
lessen its effectiveness, without really broadening the federal government's reach. What 
is needed, therefore, is comprehensive federal legislation that will incorporate the best 
parts of existing federal and state statutes. 
IV. Proposal 
Congress has recognized the need for reform in cyberstalking legislation. 234 Their 
proposed revisions-specifically with respect to§ 2261A-do not, however, go far 
enough. 235 Cyberstalking reform must also include amendments that broaden the scope 
of punishable acts, remove jurisdictional impediments, and, in order to ensure effective 
enforcement, provide victims a private cause of action. 
First,§ 2261A(l) should be amended by removing the requirement that the stalker 
cross state lines, and require only that a portion of the cyberstalker' s course of conduct 
take place online. Recall that Wyoming's stalking statute reflected the increasingly 
common reality that stalkers utilize the Internet as a tool to facilitate traditional, in-person 
234 S. 224, 112th Cong. (2011). 
235 Amended§ 2261A(b)(l) would remove the requirement that the stalker and victim be in different states 
where the stalker "uses the mail, any interactive computer service, or any other facility of interstate or 
foreign commerce." S. 224, I 12th Cong. (2011). By suggesting this change, Congress appears to have 
recognized what this Comment earlier suggested: that the use of the Internet itself satisfies the Commerce 
.Clause. 
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stalking.236 In that sense, cyberstalking can be a means, rather than an end?37 Liam 
Youens did not utilize the Internet as a means of torment, but as a way to collect 
information about Amy Lynn Boyer so that he could be a more effective stalker in the 
physical world. 238 When stalkers use the Internet as a virtual alternative to monitoring 
movements in person, the online pursuit should be no less culpable than the physical 
pursuit. The law must recognize that when stalkers use the Internet, they utilize a facility 
of interstate commerce, and, as a result, the requirement that they physically cross state 
lines becomes superfluous. It limits the number of cases that the federal government can 
pursue, without adding value. When a portion of the stalker's course of conduct takes 
place online, the law must not also require that the stalker physically cross state lines. 
The amended statute must also explicitly recognize that the "following" of a 
victim-language that appears in Wyoming's la~39-may occur online, and must be 
included within the prohibited "course of conduct." The current version of§ 2261A(2) 
prohibits the "use of the mail, any interactive computer service, or any facility of 
interstate or foreign commerce to engage in a course of conduct that causes substantial 
emotional distress to that person."240 By its terms, online information gathering about a 
victim would not be punishable. It is difficult, for instance, to assert that a victim will 
have suffered emotional distress from being pursued online when the victim is unaware 
he or she is being pursued. When the online course of conduct extends beyond covert 
236 Wyoming's statute defmed the punishable course of conduct to include any of the following: "(i) 
Communicating, anonymously or otherwise, or causing a communication with another person by verbal, 
electronic ... means in a manner that harasses; (ii) Following a person ... ; (iii) Placing a person under 
surveillance ... ; (iv) Otherwise engaging in a course of conduct that harasses another person." WYO. 
STAT. ANN. § 6-2-506 (1977). 
237 See Wright, supra note 12. 
238 ld Recall Youens's own opinion on the matter: "It's actually obscene what you can fmd out about a 
person on the internet." !d. 
239 WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-506 (1977). 
240 18 U.S.C. § 2261A(2) (emphasis added). 
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intelligence gathering into malicious harassment, then§ 2261A(2) clearly kicks in. But 
when the only online activity goes unnoticed by the victim,§ 2261(2) appears not to 
apply. 
Returning to the Boyer case underscores this point.241 Boyer never noticed 
Youens's Internet activity .242 By its own terms,§ 2261A(2) most likely does not apply, 
because Y ouens' s online course of conduct did not cause his victim substantial emotional 
distress.243 But§ 2261A(l) would not apply either, because Youens did not cross state 
lines in his physical pursuit of Boyer. Amending§ 2261A(l) to allow prosecution when 
the stalker utilizes the Internet, but does not cross state lines, as well as explicitly 
recognizing that mere online information gathering is a part of the culpable course of 
conduct, repairs this infirmity. 
Next, Congress should amend§ 2261A(2) by removing the requirement that the 
stalker and victim be in different states. As previously noted, United States v. MacEwan 
held that the Internet is a channel and an instrumentality of interstate commerce; 
therefore, the Commerce Clause regulates the transmission of child pornography even if 
the transmission does not cross state lines.244 In so holding, the court analogized the 
Internet to other traditional instrumentalities of interstate commerce, like bridges, 
railways, and airplanes.245 Moreover, MacEwan was not an isolated holding. In United 
States v. Extreme Associates, the court held that the "Internet is a channel of commerce 
covered by the federal statutes regulating the distribution of obscenity."246 
241 And ignoring, for now, that Youens eventually murdered Boyer. Wright, supra note 12. 
242 !d. 
243 18 U.S.C. § 2261A(2)(B). 
244 445 F.3d 237 (3d Cir. 2006). 
245 !d. at 245 n.8. 
246 431 F.3d ISO, 161 (3d Cir. 2005). 
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Therefore, the requirement in§ 2261A(2) that the victim be "a person in another 
State" is unnecessary when the Internet is involved. Despite Congress's initial reticence, 
it seems to have recognized this important point of law more recently. Its proposed 
amendment to § 2261 A states that "[i]t shall be unlawful for any person, with intent to 
kill, physically injure, harass, or intimidate another person, to engage in a course of 
conduct ... that uses the mail, any interactive computer service, or any other facility of 
interstate or foreign commerce."247 This amendment is important for two related reasons. 
First, it would remove the current requirement that the victim and stalker be in different 
states.248 Second, the language used-"that uses the mail, any interactive computer 
service, or any other facility of interstate or foreign commerce''249-suggests that 
Congress considers an interactive computer service a facility of interstate commerce. 
Congress should speedily adopt this revision. 
Next, Congress should insert a provision similar to one present in Illinois's law.250 
As noted above, the law makes it a crime to "create[] and maintain[] an Internet website 
or webpage which is accessible to one or more third parties'' that either "communicates a 
threat ... [or] places that person or a family member in reasonable apprehension of 
immediate or future bodily harm ... or solicits an act" that would be a violation of 
Illinois's code.251 This type of language appears to cover two types of conduct: 
"cyberstalking by proxy," and conduct like that of William Lawrence Cassidy, where 
there is no direct communication between the stalker and victim. 252 
247 S. 224, 112th Cong. (20ll). 
248 I 8 U.S.C. § 226IA(2)(B). 
249 S. 224, I 12th Cong. (20 I I). 
250 720 ILL.COMP.STAT. § 5112-7.5 (2011). 
25t Id 
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This Comment's final suggestion returns again to the Boyer case. After her 
murder, Boyer's estate brought suit against Docusearch for providing Youens with the 
information that led to her killing.253 Docusearch argued that it owed no duty to Boyer, 
and the District Court for the District ofNew Hampshire certified the question to the 
New Hampshire Supreme Court.254 The Supreme Court imposed a duty on 
Docusearch.255 In so concluding, the court began with the general rule that "[a]ll persons 
have a duty to exercise reasonable care not to subject others to an unreasonable risk of 
harm."256 Duty does not arise solely from relationships, the court noted, but also "from 
the need for protection against reasonably foreseeable harm."257 Generally, however, 
because "actor[ s] may reasonably proceed on the assumption that others will obey the 
law," criminal misconduct is unforeseeable.258 There are three exceptions to this general 
rule: (1) where a special relationship exists, (2) where special circumstances exist, and (3) 
where the duty has been voluntarily assumed. 259 There are special circumstances "where 
there is 'an especial temptation and opportunity for criminal misconduct brought about by 
the defendant. "'260 After all, where one creates a situation that "involves an unreasonable 
risk of harm to another," he or she has a duty to prevent that risk from occurring, 261 
regardless of whether the "exact occurrence or precise injuries" were foreseeable.262 
Critically, the court held that the rise in cyberstalking has created just such a foreseeable 
253 Remsburg v. Docusearch, No. CIV. 00-211-B, 2002 WL 844403 (D.N.H. Apr. 25, 2002). 
254 !d. 
255 Remsberg v. Docusearch, 816 A.2d 1001, 1006 (N.H. 2003). 
256 ld at 1007. 
257 Id (citing Hungerford v. Jones, 722 A.2d 478, 480 (1998)). 
258 Id (citing Walls v. Oxford Mgmt. Co., 137 N.H. 653, 657-58 (1993)). 
259 ld 
260 Id (citing Walls, 137 N.H. at 658.) 
261 Remsberg, 816 A.2d at 1007. 
262 Id (citing Ianelli v. Burger King Corp., 145 N.H. 190, 194 (2000)). 
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risk. 263 Therefore, the court held, if a data broker like Docusearch' s "disclosure of 
infom1ation to a client creates a foreseeable risk of criminal misconduct against the third 
person whose information was disclosed, the investigator owes a duty to exercise 
reasonable care not to subject the third person to an unreasonable risk ofharm."264 
Congress should follow in the footsteps of the New Hampshire Supreme Court 
and include in§ 2261A a private cause of action for victims of cyberstalking against data 
brokers who have breached a duty of reasonable care to the people whose information 
they sell?65 Incorporating such a remedy would facilitate the government's goals. After 
all, the provision's very existence would create a disincentive to data brokers to 
haphazardly provide private individuals' sensitive information to others. By cutting off 
the dissemination of this private information at its source, the government should be able 
to prevent-rather than punish-cyberstalking. 
V. Conclusion 
When the worlds of crime and technology collide, law enforcement is always left 
fighting to keep up. Advances arrive at a head-spinning rate, and criminals tend to be 
quick learners. Despite the government's best intentions, it has not been able to keep 
pace with technological "advancements" in cyberstalking. New ways to distribute and 
collect information have supplanted older and established means, allowing cyberstalkers 
to skirt the edges of established law. By necessity, the states and Congress have attacked 
the problem in piecemeal fashion, addressing specific problems when they arise. While 
263 Remsberg, 816 A.2d at 1007. 
264 Id 
265 For a discussion on the applicability of the tort of intrusion in this context, see William Dalsen, Civil 
Remedies for Invasions of Privacy: A Perspective on Software Vendors and Intrusion upon Seclusion, 2009 
Wrs. L. REv. 1059 (2009). 
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these stopgap measures were no doubt just when they were first contemplated, the 
resulting collection of divergent approaches has created a muddled system of overlapping 
obligations. Simplifying the federal government's approach while broadening its reach 
will eliminate confusion and allow the federal government to pursue a wide range of 
dangerous criminals. Adopting these proposed revisions and excising the state approach 
should correct some of the current ills, and protect some currently vulnerable victims. 
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